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This paper contributes to a fast growing literature which introduces game theory in
the analysis of real option investments in a competitive setting. Speciﬁcally, in this
paper we focus on the issue of multiple equilibria and on the implications that differ-
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libria and we show under which conditions different tie-breaking rules result in dif-
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper contributes to a novel and fast growing literature which introduces game
theory in the analysis of real options investments in competitive settings. Speciﬁ-
cally, in this paper we focus on the issue of multiple equilibria and on the implica-
tions that different equilibrium selections may have for the valuation of real options.
We present some theoretical results and we apply our analysis to the valuation of a
real estate development in South London.
The application of real options theory to commercial real estate has developed
rapidly during the last 15 years and various pricing models have been applied to
real estate developments to value embedded real options (see for example Titman
(1985), Grenadier (1996), Williams (1991) and Williams (1993)). The combination of
game and real options theory has proved to offer useful insights for the valuation
of real estate developments in markets where different developers are in competi-
tion. As far as the pricing of real options is concerned, the existing contributions
have used either the binomial option valuation method of Rubinstein, Cox and Ross
(1979) in discrete time (see for example the early contribution of Smith and Ankum
(1993)) or an equilibrium approach in continuous time (see for example Grenadier
(1996)). In both approaches to the valuation of real options, the introduction of game
theoretical settings – in orderto model the competition between developers– implies
the possibility of multiple equilibria (i.e. multiple optimal investment decisions) and
such multiplicity is problematic for the option pricing methods.
In a set-up with continuous time, it may be the case that two developers ﬁnd
optimal to invest at the same time, but in order to value the option to invest it is
necessary to have a ﬁrst mover (the leader) and a follower. Grenadier proposed
a simple tie- breaking rule (toss of a coin) to solve this problem and Huisman et
al. (2003) have proposed a more sophisticated solution based on the use of mixed
strategies.
In a discrete time framework, developers play a simultaneous game (invest or
defer) at the beginning of each period and there can be multiple equilibria in which
either developer invests while the other defers. This is problematic because in order
to value an investment, it is necessary to have single equilibrium outcomes at each
nodeof the gameand itisnot apriori clearhowto selectbetween multiple equilibria.3
In this paper we propose three tie-breaking (or equilibrium selection) rules which
are standard in game theory (min-max payoff, coin-toss, mixed strategy) and we
show howthe use of these rules can implydifferent valuations and economic conclu-
sions. For example, selecting between multiple equilibria with the min-max payoff
rather than using a coin-toss rule implies a more pessimistic valuation of the future
payoff from deferring and hence it may imply that investing becomes optimal when
deferring would instead be optimal under a coin-toss rule (i.e. a min-max payoff
brings the investment decision forward because it gives preference to earlier cash
ﬂows).
The possibility of multiple equilibria in set-up with discrete time has been men-
tioned byTrigeorgis (1996)andMarcato andLimentani(2008), butto ourknowledge,
no other paper has so far investigated different tie-breaking rules and the relative
implications. With this modeling exercise, we indirectly introduce investor’s pref-
erences for future outcomes that can be read as different risk aversion/propensity
levels. Consequently, in our theoretical framework we model and test both market
conditions (i.e. levels of competition) and investor’s preferences (i.e. tie-breaking
rules) identifying the marginal effect that each one of them has on the other.
This paper is organized in a theoretical analysis and an application of the the-
ory to a case study. In section 2 we introduce the game theoretical framework and
show the necessary conditions to have multiple equilibria. In section 3 we highlight
under which conditions different tie-breaking rules result in different economic con-
clusions. Finally, we apply the theoretical results to the valuation of a mixed-use
development project in South London (section 4) and we report how different tie-
breaking rules imply different valuations and investment decisions in section 5. We
draw our main conclusions in section 6.
2. NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CASE OF MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
Game theory is a discipline that studies situations of strategic interaction, i.e. situa-
tions (games)in which the action ofan individual (player)affects the utility (pay-off) of
other individuals and in which individuals (players) behave strategically taking this
interdependence into account. In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule pre-
dicting which strategies will be adopted by players, therefore predicting the result of
the game. A strategy consists of a rule specifying which actions a player should take4
given theactions taken byother players. The mostcommonly used solution concepts
are equilibrium concepts. Loosely speaking, an equilibrium consists of a strategy pro-
ﬁle (one for each player) such that each player should not have any advantage by
changing her strategy. The seminal Nash (1950) equilibrium consists in a strategic
proﬁle such that each player’s strategy is a best response to the strategies chosen by
the other players. Given a set of feasible strategies for a player i and the strategies
chosen by the other players, a best response is the strategy associated to highest pay-
off for player i. In order to clarify these concepts, we introduce the following game
in which two players decide whether to invest (I) or defer (D).
Game 1: Payoffs.
I D
I 2 , 2 4 , 3
D 3 , 4 1 , 1
The game matrix describes four possible outcomes, where the ﬁrst and second num-
ber in each cell respectively represents the payoff for the player which moves along
the rows (the “row”player) and the payoff for the player which moves along the
columns (the “column”player). If both players invest, each of them gets a pay-
off equal to 2; if the “row”player invests while the “column”player defers the re-
spectively get a payoff equal to 4 and 3; if the “row”player defers while the “col-
umn”player invests they respectively get a payoff equal to 3 and 4; if both players
defer each of them gets a payoff equal to 1. This is a symmetric game, because for
both players a speciﬁc action I (D) gives the same payoff, given the action of the
other player. In other words symmetry implies that the identities of the players can
be changed without changing the payoffs associated to the strategies. In Game 1,
given that one player invests, for the other player it is optimal to defer, because de-
ferring gives a payoff equal to 3, whereas investing gives a lower payoff equal to 2.
Likewise, given that one player defers, the optimal choice of the other player is to
invest because investing gives a payoff equal to 4, whereas deferring would give a
lower payoff equal to 1. In a Nash equilibrium every player maximizes her own pay-
off function, given all the other players strategies, hence in Game 1 there exist two
Nash equilibria. The two equilibria are respectively one in which the row player in-
vests while the column player defers and a symmetric one in which the row player5
defers while the column player invests. An intuitive method to ﬁnd the Nash equi-
libria of such a 2-players games is to underline the payoffs corresponding to the best
responses. Looking at the payoffs of the row player, if the column player plays I the
best response payoff is 3, if the column player plays D the best response payoff is
4. The best response payoffs are identical for the column player given the symmetry
of the game. As the game matrix shows, underlying the payoffs which correspond
to the best responses we can easily identify the two Nash equilibria of the game as
those situations in which both players play the best responses to each other.
Game 1: Nash Equilibria.
I D
I 2 , 2 4 , 3
D 3 , 4 1 , 1




I 4 , 4 2 , 1
D 1 , 2 3 , 3
Looking at the payoffs of the row player, if the column player plays I the best re-
sponse for the row player is to invest, as investing gives a payoff of 4 while deferring
would give a payoff of 1. If the column player plays D the best response for the row
player is to defer, as deferring gives a payoff of 3 while investing would give a lower
payoff of 2. The best response payoffs are identical for the column player given the
symmetry of the game. As the game matrix shows, underlying the payoffs which
correspond to best responses we can easily identify the two Nash equilibria of the
game, respectively “invest, invest”(I,I) and “defer, defer”(D,D). It is useful to look at
a generalized version of the same game.
Game 3: Generalized Payoffs.6
I D
I a , a b , c
D c , b d , d
Notice that the symmetry of the game implies that for both players a speciﬁc action I
(D) gives the payoff a (c) given that the other player plays I and it gives the payoff b
(d)given that the other player plays D. Assuming that a,b,c,d ar all different payoffs,
we can identify two conditions:
(i) a > c, d > b
and
(ii) a < c, d < b.
either of which is necessary and sufﬁcient for the existence of multiple equilibria.
If a > c and d > b, as the matrix game below shows, the two underlined Nash
equilibria are I,I and D,D.
Game 3a. Generalized Nash equilibria if a > c and d > b.
I D
I a , a b , c
D c , b d , d
If a < c, d < b, as the matrix game below shows, the two underlined Nash equilibria
are I,D and D,I.
Game 3b. Generalized Nash equilibria if a < c, d < b.
I D
I a , a b , c
D c , b d , d
Each of the two conditions is necessary for for the existence of multiple equilibria as
it is immediate that if a > c, d < b the unique equilibrium is I,I and that if a < c, d > b
the unique equilibrium is D,D.
In the case of multiple equilibria there is a natural problem of equilibrium se-
lection.
1 We hereby introduce three very simple selection (i.e. tie-breaking) rules.
The main point we want to illustrate is that different tie-breaking rules may imply
1The literature on equilibrium selections is quite vast and we can refer the interested readers to the
seminal contribution of Harsany and Selten (1988).7
sensible differences in valuations and therefore it is very important to know the im-
plications of different decision rules.
Expected payoff rule. In the case of two simultaneous equilibria, this rule implies
that the two equilibria have equal probability (i.e. 50% probability each). Intuitively,
given that the two equilibria are exactly symmetric, according to this rule the equi-
librium effectively taking place is decided by the toss of a fair coin. Going back to
the previous example of game 3, if a < c, d < b, as the matrix game shows, the two
Nash equilibria are I,D and D,I. Under the expected pay-off rule, for each player the
expected pay-off from taking part in the game is
b+c
2 . In terms of investor’s prefer-
ences, this rule would imply an average risk aversion as the investor does not place
a different weight on the two possible outcomes.
Min-max payoff rule. In the case of two simultaneous equilibria the rule implies
that a player who wants to value the payoff from participating in the game, assigns
probability one to the equilibrium in which she gets the lowest payoff. This rule is
known as min-maxbecause this is the minimum payoff that will be achieved playing
rationally (i.e. playing the best response). It is intuitive that such valuation of the
game’s payoff is more “pessimistic”than the one of the expected payoff rule and
could possibly imply more risk aversion. Going back again to game 3b, given a <
c, d < b and in addition b > c (b < c), for each player the expected payoff from
participating in the game is equal to c (b).
Max-max payoff rule. In the case of two simultaneous equilibria the rule implies
that a player who wants to value the payoff from participating in the game, assigns
probability one to the equilibrium in which she gets the highest payoff. This rule
is known as max-max because this is the maximum payoff that will be achieved
playing rationally (i.e. playing the best response). It is intuitive that such valuation
of the game’s payoff is the more “optimistic”than the one of the expected payoff rule
and could possibly imply a move towards a more aggressive risk taking position.
Going back again to game 3b, given a < c, d < b and in addition b > c (b < c), for
each player the expected payoff from participating in the game is equal to b (c).8
It is worth specifying that we have decided to focus on those three simple rules
because they are intuitive from a valuation’s point of view.
2 To move from the min-
max to the max-max rule can be intuitively interpreted as a shift from the most risk
averse valuation to the least risk averse valuation as the certainty equivalent that an
investor would be willing to pay to enter the game decreases. The expected payoff
rule, instead, averages the valuations of the two extreme rules with equal weights.
Consequently, we could think of other cases for which the min-max and the max-
max valuations are averaged with different weights, moving in a continuous linear
function from 0% to 100% for the maximum payoff possible, and from 100% to 0%
for the minimum payoff possible.
2Thetheory of equilibrium selection is quite vastandmoresophisticated –orcomplicated–rules could
in principle be used.9
3. MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DIFFERENT TIE-BREAKING RULES IN THE BINOMIAL
VALUATION MODEL
Smit and Ankum (1993) merge game theory with real option analysis in order to
modelcompetition betweentwoinvestorswhobothhavetheoption todeferaproject.
We present a simple version of their model including all the necessary features in or-
der to illustrate our contribution. We consider two investors A and B that are poten-
tially equal and therefore can be modeled through a symmetric game. Each investor
has a strategy set Xi = {I,D} with i = A,B, where (I) is the decision to invest in
the project, and (D) is the decision to defer the investment. The decision to defer
D, according to the real option analysis , can be modeled as a call option C. Smit
and Ankum (1993) consider the binomial model of Rubinstein, Cox and Ross (1979)
in order to value the option to defer the investment. Following their model, we la-
bel with St,h the underlying value of the asset at time t after h upwards movements
along the binomial tree and Kc represents investment costs. Since we only consider
the pure strategies to invest versus defer (i.e. I and D are mutually exclusive), the
symmetry of the game implies three possible outcomes in each period:
• When both investors A and B invest, the game ends. In this situation we start
to note the ﬁrst novelty that the addition of competition brings: instead of the
usual intrinsic value St,h−KC each investor gets a payoff equal to ν St,h−KC,
where ν is the proportion of value when both competitors invest.
• When both investors defer, nature (N) moves (we can have either an upward
movement u or a downward movement d) along the binomial tree and the
game is repeated.
• When one investor (leader) invests ﬁrst and the other (follower) decides to
invest later, i.e. defers. In this case the payoff of the leader is θSt,h − KC.
Subsequently, when the follower starts to invest her payoff will be some pro-
portion of the value ζ St,h−KC (please note that in our modelling exercise we
assume that he leader will always obtain a greater payoff than the follower
because θ is bigger than ζ.
In our numerical examples we set θ = expν−1 and ζ = 2 ∗ ν − θ. This assures that
θ > ν > ζ, which is a feature of the Cournot-Stackelberg framework. Increasing
ν means decreasing the extent of competition as the percentage of the value which10
can be appropriated by simultaneous investments decreases in ν. For ν ≤ 1, the
difference between θ and ζ decreases in ν up to the point that ν = θ = ζ = 1.
Therefore, for ν ≤ 1, the parameters describe a competitive market with ﬁrst mover
advantage and where the extent of ﬁrst mover advantage decreases in the extent of
competition (i.e. the difference between the payoffs of leader and follower increases
as the level of market competition increases).
In our numerical examples, we also consider the case of ν > 1. Also for this case,
we set θ = expν−1 and ζ = 2 ∗ ν − θ which imply that θ > ν > ζ. Given that ν > 1,
a simultaneous investment for the two players increases the value of the asset above
S0. We interpret this case as a situation where two development projects which are
started at the same time imply positive externalities.
3 Maintaining that θ > ν > ζ
implies that there is still a ﬁrst mover’s advantage. In the case of ν > 1, we do not
interpret the ﬁrst mover advantage as deriving from preventive competition; rather,
we interpret this market as one where the ﬁrst mover has still a relative advantage
since moving ﬁrst gives her better freedom of choice (i.e. to chosse the most prof-
itable investment between the available ones). For ν > 1, the difference between θ
and ζ increases in ν. Therefore, for ν > 1, the parameters describe a market charac-
terized by positive externalities, ﬁrst mover advantage and where the extent of ﬁrst
mover’s advantage increases in the extent of positive externalities.
More generally, ﬁxing S0 and setting θ = expν−1 and ζ = 2∗ν −θ allows us to vary
the value of ν continuously and study the effect of changing the extent of the ﬁrst
mover’s advantage by comparative statics.
Insert ﬁgure 1 here.
3Suchcaseis interesting for manyrealestateprojectsas theconstruction ofcomplementary complexes
of buildings (e.g. housing block and shopping centre) may result in higher individual values for the
beneﬁt obtained by the presence of the other property. if we take a housing block and a shopping
centre as an example, we see that houses will be worth more if there is an accessible shopping centre
in the area. And on the other hand, a centre is more valuable if there are new houses built in the
area as the determine an increase of potential customers for the same shopping centre’s radius. This
argument is also true in the case of the development of two similar properties. If we consider the
construction of two shopping centres with slightly different focus and tenancy mix, they may attract
a bigger number of customers because customers may be willing to travel a longer distance should
they ﬁnd two malls not far from each other. This would increase the radius the two shopping centres
serve and then augment the retail spending and, along with it rents (through revenue-related rents)
and hence capital values.11
Figure 2 illustrates a two period version of this game
4.
Insert ﬁgure 2 here.
We can give the payoff matrix of the game played at time t in state of nature h.
Game 4. Generalized game in node t,h.
Invest Defer





t,h , θSt,h − KCe−r(T−t) Ct,h , Ct,h
where:





ζ St,h − KCe−r(T−t) , 1
er(T−t)[qC
post














∀t = 0,...,T, ∀h = 0,...,T and i = A,B.
Ei
t,h indicates the Nash equilibrium payoff for player i in the game played at time t
and state of nature h. The fact that it is possible to have equilibria I,D or D,I where
the two players obtain different payoffs implies that Ei
t,h – and recursively Ci
t,h – are
indexed by the player’s identity i.
In order to complete the formulation we remember that at maturity T we have the
following values:






4Differently from the rest of the analysis, in the ﬁgure investment costs are not discounted and ζ =
1 − θ.12
Once the binomial tree with gamesin each node isconstructed, it becomes easy to set
a strategic tree for each investor. In order to value the option to defer, it is necessary
to assign a value to each game-node. Hence, it is extremely important to address
the question of what value should be assigned to each player in the case of multiple
equilibria (i.e. both are equilibria and so a rule needs to be identiﬁed).
5
Generally, following the analysis of game 3 in section 2 we have the following
two necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria at a
generic node t,h: either (i) θSt,h − KCer(T−t) > Ct,h, C
post
t,h > ν St,h − KCer(T−t) where
equilibriaare both I,Dand D,Ior (ii) θSt,h−KCer(T−t) < Ct,h, C
post
t,h < ν St,h−KCer(T−t)
where equilibria are both I,I and D,D.
In order to illustrate the possibility of multiple equilibria it is useful to analyze the
game matrix at maturity. The ﬁrst reason for doing so is that the binomial valuation
model imposes to start at maturity and to move backwards. The second reason is
that the condition for multiple equilibria at a generic node t,h cannot say much on
the valuesof the parameterswhich willimplymultiple equilibria, given thatSt,h,Ct,h
and C
post
t,h are endogenous variables which depend on the parameters and on the
equilibria in the future periods. Instead studying the game at maturity T implies
that both CT,h and C
post
T,h are equal to zero and hence we can ﬁnd precise conditions
on the parameters for multiple equilibria. Consider the following payoff matrix for
the game at maturity.
Game 5. Generalized game in node T,h.
Invest Defer
Invest ν ST,h − KC , ν ST,h − KC θST,h − KC 0 , 0
Defer 0 , θST,h − KC 0 , 0
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A sufﬁcient condition to have multiple equilibria is θ >
KC
ST,h > ν.
Proof. Start from the sufﬁcient condition for multiple equilibria I,D and D,I at matu-
rity T (as illustrated in game 3 in section 2): θST,h−KCer(T−t) > 0, νST,h−KCer(T−t) <
0. Together the two inequalities imply the condition in proposition 1. ￿
5Smit and Ankum (1993) ignore this case, Trigeorgis (1996) mentions this possibility but rules it out,
Limentani and Marcato (2008) mention this possibility but modify the payoff function in such a way
to rule it out.13
The economic intuition behind proposition 1 is that given the extent of ﬁrst mover
advantage – measured by θ and ν – the ratio between development cost Kc and in-
vestment value ST,h must be large enough so that the best response to an investment
of the competitor is to defer, and at the same time small enough so that the best
response to a deferral of the competitor is to invest.
Following the analysis of section 2, we can formally introduce the discussed tie-
breaking rules from the perspective of time t:
6















In general terms, given a node t + 1,h + 1 in which there are two equilibria, respec-
tively with payoff E1
t+1,h+1 and E2
t+1,h+1, and a node t + 1,h with a unique equilib-
rium with payoff Ei
t+1,h, we can identify a necessary condition such that different
tie-breaking rules in node t+1,h+1 imply different equilibrium choices in node t,h.
Considering only the expected payoff versus min-max rule, referring to game 4 we
ﬁnd the following conditions:
(i) underexpected utility rule Ct,h > θSt,h−KCe−r(T−t) and C
post
t,h > νSt,h−KCe−r(T−t).












+ (1 − q)Et+1,h
￿
.
(ii) under min-max rule, Ct,h < θSt,h−KCe−r(T−t) and C
post
t,h > νSt,h−KCe−r(T−t). This
implies that under the min-max rule the equilibria are D,I and I,D. Also notice that









+ (1 − q)Et+1,h
￿
.
The intuition for which this is a necessary condition such that different tie-breaking
rules in node t+1,h+1 imply different equilibrium choices (and hence different in-
vestment/defer economic decisions) in node t,h is as follows: different tie-breaking
rules only have an impact on the payoff of cell D,D in game 4; therefore in order to
have different equilibria, one needs that under one rule D,D is an equilibrium, while
under the other rule this is not the case. Since the payoffs in cell D,D are higher un-
der the expected utility rule than under the min-max rule, in order to have different
6Notice that the rules respectively average, minimize and maximize the equilibrium payoffs with
respect to the players’ identity i because payoffs are symmetric across players.14
equilibria it must be the case that D,D is an equilibrium only under the expected
utility rule.
Once again, in order to illustrate more precise conditions on the parameters, it is
useful to take the game matrix at maturity. Take a node T,h in which the condi-
tion of proposition 1 is satisﬁed and therefore there are two equilibria D,I and I,D.
Also assume that at node T,h−1 the unique equilibrium is D,D (hence with payoffs
Ei
T,h−1 = 0 for each player i). Consider the following matrix game at node T −1,h−1
for the case of expected payoff valuation of the payoff at T,h:
Game 6. Generalized game at node T − 1,h − 1 in the case of expected utility rule at node
T,h.
Invest Defer
Invest ν ST−1,h−1 − KCe−r , ν ST−1,h−1 − KCe−r θST−1,h−1 − KCe−r , 0
Defer 0 , θST−1,h−1 − KCe−r q
2(θST − KC)e−r ,
q
2(θST − KC)e−r
In this case the condition to have an equilibrium D,D is that
q
2(θST − KC)e−r >




sider now the following matrix game at node T − 1,h − 1 for the case of min-max
valuation of the payoff at T,h:
Game 7. Generalized game at node T − 1,h − 1 in the case of min-max rule at node T,h.
Invest Defer
Invest ν ST−1,h−1 − KCe−r , ν ST−1,h−1 − KCe−r θST−1,h−1 − KCe−r , 0
Defer 0 , θST−1,h−1 − KCe−r 0 , 0
In this case the conditions to have two equilibria (I,D) (D,I) are that (i) KC >
νST−1,h−1er and (ii) θST−1,h−1 − KCe−r > 0, which can be rewritten as νST−1,h−1er <
KC < θST−1,h−1er.
We have the following proposition.












Proof. Proposition 1 shows that the condition θST,h > KC > νST,h is sufﬁcient to
have multiple equilibria at maturity node T,h. The analysis of games 6 and 7 shows,
given multiple equilibria at node T,h, the conditions such that the expected pay-
off and min-max rules result in different investment decisions (i.e. equilibria) in
node T − 1,h − 1. After noticing that condition (i) of game 7 is already satisﬁed un-
der the condition of proposition 1, the conditions can be rewritten as θST−1,h−1er >
Kc > ( 2
2−q)(θST−1,h−1er −
q
2θST). According to the binomial valuation model ST,h =












The economic intuition behind proposition 2 is that, given the extent of the ﬁrst
mover’s advantage – measured by θ and µ –, the ratio between development costs
Kc and investment value ST,h must be large enough so that in an expected payoff
valuation to defer is a dominant strategy and, simultaneously, small enough so that
in a min-max payoff valuation the best response to a competitor’s deferral is to in-
vest. It is also important to notice that the min-max valuation of the future is more
pessimistic and therefore implies that it is optimal to invest since the competitor de-
fers, whereas the expected payoff valuation of future outcomes is more optimistic
and therefore implies that it is always optimal to defer.
In the following section we apply our framework to analyze the valuation of a real
estate development in South London. We consider several values of the parameters
ν, θ, ζ and p in order to model different types of competition across developers and
their risk attitudes towards future outcomes. We will also study the cases where
different tie-breaking rules imply different investment decisions.
4. NUMERICAL EXERCISE
Development Project in South London, United Kingdom. As a numerical exam-
ple, we use adevelopmentproject basedon a6 acresland South ofLondon. Planning
permissions have been already granted for ofﬁces (1,350k sqm), retail space [super-
market (830 sqm) and retail units (680k sqm)], a 500 space car park and a leisure
component [restaurants and bar (830k sqm), swimming pool and health club (480k
sqm), casino (259 sqm) and night club (400k sqm)]. The site was acquired at the16
price of £12.78 million and all cash ﬂow data is available to us. Since the difference
between the annual cost of £150.000 to keep the strategic option open, and the an-
nual income generated by a car park managed on the site is marginal, we assume
that there is no either cost or income in deferment other than ﬁnancial costs related
to discounting (i.e. the dividend is equal to zero). The local authority wishes to
see the site completely developed and consequently has already granted planning
permissions for the actual development to be started within the next ﬁve years.
Traditional NPV Approach and Real Option Analysis. In this study, we want to
compare our game-theoretical real option results with the value obtained through
a static NPV (i.e. Net Present Value) approach. The development phase lasts 39
months, which correspond to m = 13 periods of 3 months each. We obtain the Net
Present Value by discounting the expected cash ﬂows back to period 0 (i.e. t = 0)
using an appropriate discount rate calculated as weighted average cost of capital (i.e.
WACC) k. For both cash ﬂows and WACC, we use the information set provided by






where CFt is the expected free cash ﬂow at time t and kq is the quarterly WACC.
More speciﬁcally, the cash ﬂow at time t is computed as follows:
CFt = INCt − LANDt − DEVt
where INCt, LANDt and DEVt respectively refer to income, land acquisition costs
and development expenses, all at time t. Note that there is no income in all t except
when the completed building (i.e. t = m) is sold. By contrast, land acquisition
costs are null in every period, except in the ﬁrst one. If we discount the cash ﬂows
provided by the investor, we obtain the following static NPV of the project (if we
were not owning the land yet) as:
NPVp = £79.93 − £59.19 − £12.78 = £7.26 million
where £79.93 million is the present value of the selling price at completion, £59.19
million is the present value of all development costs and £12.78 million is the acqui-
sition price of the land. Clearly, according to the NPV rule, the project should have
been accepted.17
In addition, as the company already possesses the land, the option to defer is a func-
tion of the construction outcome only (i.e. it does not refer to the overall project
which also include the land value). Therefore the static NPV of the construction
phase only (i.e. NPVt) is obtained by adding the land cost to the static NPV of the
project:
NPVcp = £79.93 − £56.95 = £22.98 million = NPVp + LAND0
Parameters Estimation. The value of our option directly depends on 5 parameters:
initial value of the selling price S0, strike price KC, volatility of selling price σ, matu-
rity time T and risk-free rate rfr. According to the available information set, we can
easily set 4 out of 5 of these parameters:
S0 = 79.93m KC = 76m T = 5
rfr = 5%
As in Marcato etal. (2008) and Limentani and Marcato (2008), and knowing that the
selling price at completion is computed as a perpetuity of market rents (i.e. Rentt)
discounted at the relative cap rate (i.e. cap), we estimate the volatility of our de-
velopment project (i.e. σ) by applying the theory of uncertainty propagation to the
volatilities of the growth rates of market rents (i.e. h) and cap rates (i.e. g) and their
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We use 1981 to 2007 times series data provided by a worldwide real estate brokerage
ﬁrm - CB Richard Ellis (i.e. CBRE) - which gave us access to their UK Average Cap
Rate and Rental Index. The two quarterly measures indicate respectively the cap rate
and market rent of hypothetical fully rented properties with standard speciﬁcations
(i.e. a CBRE valuer is asked to give the rent and cap rate of the hypothetical prop-
erty identiﬁed by certain speciﬁc criteria, with each valuer reporting on the same18
property every quarter). The following parameters are estimated:
g = 6.79% σg = 10.11% σh = 7.14% ρgh = −0.03
while h is assumed to be equal to zero. The corresponding annual volatility is σ =
12.84%.
Since thematurity T is5years, wedevelop theexercise strategy oftheoption using
a 5-step binomial model, corresponding to a strategy model whereby the investor
can reset the strategy annually.
Competition and Positive Externalities. In order to value the project we also need
to deﬁne the values of ν, θ, ζ. Those parameters determine the market structure. ν
indicates the percentage of ﬁnal price that each developer manages to achieve when
they invest at the same.
As already explained in section 3, we set θ = expν−1 and ζ = 2∗ν−θ, which is com-
patible with the conditions of a Cournot-Stackelberg framework where θ > ν > ζ.
We let ν vary from 0.5 to 1.5, where values up to 1.0 refer to a competitive setting
with negative externalities (i.e. project values are eroded by competition) and val-
ues above 1.0 represent a market with positive externalities (i.e. the project value is
increased by the investment made by the competitor because the two goods are com-
plementary and not substitute). Finally the difference between θ and ζ represents the
advantage of being the ﬁrst mover rather than the follower.
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Effects of the number of steps. We ﬁrst analyze the impact of varying the number
of steps N which characterizes the binomial model. By construction, increasing the
number of steps increases the range of values that the asset can take. Marcato etal.
(2008) and Limentani and Marcato (2008) show that in a standard binomial model
without game-theory, increasing the number of steps implies that the value of the
deferral option converges to the Black and Scholes value. We show that this result
also holds in a binomial model with game theory, where increasing the number of
steps brings towards convergency.
Insert ﬁgure 3 here.19
Insert ﬁgure 4 here.
Insert ﬁgure 5 here.
Insert ﬁgure 6 here.
Optimal Strategies. We analyze the outcomes of the games which are played along
the binomial tree. Following the analysis of game 4 in section 3, we can identify three
possible outcomes:
(i) Whenever the payoff from deferring is higher than the payoff from investing ﬁrst,
deferring is a dominant strategy and D,D is the unique equilibrium.
(ii) Whenever the payoff from deferring is between those from investing ﬁrst and
from simultaneous investment, both D,I and I,D are equilibria.
(iii) Whenever the payoff from deferring when the other player invests is lower than
the payoff from simultaneous investment, I,I is the unique equilibrium. In this case,
there is a prisoner dilemma if I,I < D,D.
We can notice that the payoffs from investing ﬁrst and from simultaneous in-
vestment increase in ν and therefore it is the value of ν to determine which of the





(i) if ν < ν′
t,h D,D is the equilibrium in node t,h
(ii) if ν′
t,h ≤ ν < ν′′
t,h both D,I and I,D are equilibria in node t,h
(iii) if ν′′
t,h ≤ ν < ν′′′
t,h I,I is the equilibrium in node t,h, but I,I < D,D (prisoner
dilemma)
(iv) if ν ≥ ν′′′
t,h I,I is the equilibrium in node t,h and I,I > D,D (no prisoner
dilemma).
In our numerical example (with 100 steps) we ﬁnd that the threshold values for
the initial node are ν′
t,h = 1.1, ν′′
t,h = 1.12, ν′′′
t,h = 1.13.
Summarizing, we ﬁnd that increasing the extent of competition (i.e. decreasing ν)
decreases the likelihood of investing as greater competition implies smaller payoffs
for both ﬁrst movers and simultaneous investments. This result parallels some re-
lated results of Grandier (1995) and Smit and Trigeorgis (2001). In those works the
extent of competition cannot be changed exogenously as each competitor’s share of20
market demand is endogenously determined within the equilibrium concept. Nev-
ertheless, as in our model, they show the existence of threshold levels of revenues
that determine different equilibria. Likewise our result, they ﬁnd that no player in-
vests if the revenue is lower than a certain threshold, there is a ﬁrst mover if the
revenue is higher than this threshold and both players invest simultaneously if the
revenue is above an even higher threshold.
7
Effect of ν. In this section we study how the value of deferring changes as a func-
tion of ν. Figure 7 plots the payoffs from deferring (blue) and from simultaneous
investment (red) as functions of ν, given 100 steps and different tie-breaking rules.
Insert ﬁgure 7 here.
We notice from the graphs that, irrespectively of the tie-breaking rule, the pay-
off from deferral increases exponentially as competition decreases. The reason why
the payoff from deferral decreases with competition is straightforward. The value
of deferral is given by value of the future (equilibrium) investments. Future equi-
librium investments can be simultaneous (in which case the revenue is multiplied
by ν) or as ﬁrst mover ((in which case the revenue is multiplied by θ). The value
of future investments decreases in competition because both ν and θ decrease with
competition.
The aspect that is more subtle is that the exact value of deferral depends on which
are the future equilibria: namely on which nodes have simultaneous investment
and ﬁrst mover’s investment as equilibrium strategy. The parameter θ increases
exponentially in ν. As θ is a component of some of the future equilibrium values, the
value of deferral increases exponentially as θ decreases. However, we also highlight
anothereffect: asν increases, thevalue ofsimultaneous investmentincreases. Aftera
certain threshold, simultaneous investment becomes an equilibrium outcome. When
simultaneous investment is the equilibrium outcome in every node, the value of
deferral does not depend on θ. Consequently, from this point onwards the value of
deferral coincides with the value of simultaneous investment and hence it increases
linearly in ν.
Effect of different tie-breaking rules. In order to show the effect of different tie-
breaking rules, we focus on three different market structures:
7This parallels our result as in our framework the revenue for the investor increases in ν.21
1. High competition: ν = 0.55, θ = 0.638, ζ = 0.462
2. Low competition: ν = 0.8, θ = 0.819, ζ = 0.781
3. Positive externalities: ν = 1.2, θ = 1.221, ζ = 1.179
The following table shows the value of deferral for each market structure for the
three different tie-breaking rules:
Table 1. Value of deferral for different ν and different p
p = 0.1 p = 0.5 p = 1
ν = 0.55 0.4 0.8 3.1
ν = 0.8 9.8 10.1 11
ν = 1.2 38 38 38
The effect of p decreases as ν increases. Explanation: when ν is low the value of
deferral depends on future equilibria where some of those equilibria are D,I I,D.
The tie-breaking rule has an effect because it selects between those different equilib-
rium values. As we have shown in the previous section, as ν increases the number
of future equilibria I,I increases relative to the D,I I,D equilibria and therefore
the impact of the tie-breaking rule is reduced (as the tie-breaking rule impacts on a
smaller number of equilibria). Finally, for ν ≥ 1.2 all the equilibria along the tree are
of the I,I type and therefore the tie-breaking rule has no impact at all.
On theotherhandintheneighborhood ofthethreshold valuesofν the tie-breaking
rule has an impact on the equilibrium strategies as it changes the threshold values
of ν (being those functions of p). Figure 9 shows that for ν = 1.1, I,D D,I are equi-
libria for p ≤ 0.77, but I,I becomes the equilibrium for p > 0.77. A more optimistic
tie-breaking rule pushes both competitors to invest.
Insert ﬁgure 9 here.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a model built within previous literature on real option pric-
ing and game theory and contributes to shed light upon strategic settings where
the presence of multiple equilibria situations require equilibrium selection criteria.
Along with presenting some theoretical results, we apply three different tie-breaking22
rules (i.e. min-max payoff, coin-toss, max-max strategy) to the valuation of a de-
velopment project in South London using a binomial option valuation model in a
discrete time framework.
Our framework allows us to consider different market structures where we com-
bine different levels of market competition and investors’ risk aversion. We show
how the use of different tie-breaking rules can imply different strategies and hence
different valuation and economic outcomes. We ﬁnd that risk aversion reduces op-
tion value (i.e. the value is higher for a max-max than for a min-max strategy) and
this reduction decreases marginally as negative externalities (i.e. disincentives to
defer) decrease.
These results are economically important because investors with different risk
aversions may decide to use different rules (i.e. weighting between deferral and
investment payoffs) and then obtain signiﬁcantly different option values. This result
has important strategic implications which may be further studied by introducing
asymmetric investor types within the same market and their different speeds of re-
action to competitors’ decisions.23
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FIGURE 1. Market structure25
FIGURE 2. Two period strategic game Investment, Defer. Source: Li-
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FIGURE 6. Value of deferral option (blue) and simultaneous invest-
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FIGURE 9. Payoffs from different strategies as a function of p, for 100
steps and ν = 1.1